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COURT OF APPEALS, 1961 TERM
in its favor," and that the utility of a panel made up of these experts would
far outweigh any infringements upon the public's voice in the selection of a
Board of Education.
B.D.K.
PERMANENT STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION AND ASSESSMENT HELD PROPERLY
CONSTITUTED
In 1949 the Legislature created a temporary State Board of Equalization
and Assessment. It consisted of three members who were appointed by the
Governor and was empowered to review and revise State equalization rates.
This board was continued in existence by subsequent acts of the Legislature
until April 1, 1960, when there was created a permanent State Board of
Equalization and Assessment. This permanent board consisted of the Com-
missioner for Local Government and four others to be appointed by the
Governor. The Governor, however, failed to make any appointments to
the permanent board until January 1961, when the three persons who
had been on the temporary board were appointed to the permanent board.
These were the only appointments made. In August 1960, the three men who
had constituted the temporary board made a determination reducing the
equalization rate for the Town of Smithtown. One month later, petitioner
(town) instituted an article 78 proceeding pursuant to section 760 of the Real
Property Tax Law to annul the determination. The petitioner argued that the
permanent board could not be properly constituted until the Governor ap-
pointed its full complement of five members, and since at the time the deter-
mination was made no one had been appointed to the permanent board, the
action taken by the respondents was void. Additionally, petitioner claimed that
in any case, the rate fixed was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. The
lower court dismissed the petition, and the intermediate court affirmed the
dismissal. On appeal by permission to the Court of Appeals, held, affirmed, one
judge dissenting. The permanent board was properly constituted at the time the
determination was made since a reading of the statute which created that board
showed that the three respondents were empowered to act as the majority of
the permanent board. Furthermore, despite the fact that certain erroneous
material was used by the board in making its determination, the rate fixed was
not arbitrary because this material was furnished by local assessors, and the
overall methods used by the Board in determining the rate were adequate.
Town of Smithtown v. Moore, 11 N.Y.2d 238, 183 N.E.2d 66, 228 N.Y.S.2d 657
(1962).1
In New York, when a problem of statutory construction arises, the courts
will attempt to determine the intent of the Legislature from the language of
the statute,2 and effect will be given, when possible, to the plain meaning of
1. 14 A.D.2d 229, 218 N.Y.S.2d 802 (3d Dep't 1961).
2. Dept. of Welfare of City of New York v. Siebel, 6 N.Y.2d 536, 161 N.E.2d 1,
190 N.Y.S.2d 683 (1959), appeal dismissed, 361 U.S. 535 (1960).
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the statute.3 However, literal' meanings will not be adhered to to defeat the
general purpose and manifest policy intended to be promoted. 4 Further, a
statute must be ambiguous before aids to construction are 'consulted,5 but
when doubt arises as to the meaning of a statute, results are an important
clue to meaning. 6
In the instant case the Governor did not appoint the three members of
the old Board to the permanent Board until after the rate determination in
question. However, the Court pointed out that this fact was not crucial since
the law which created the new Board provided for the transfer of the officers
and employees from the temporary Board to the permanent one. The Court
declared that the law also provided for a continuity of functions and powers
running from the temporary Board to the permanent Board and that under
New York law the three members constituted a working majority. The Court
reasoned, therefore, that the Legislature must have intended that there should
be no break in the work of the Board no matter how great the Governor's
delay in appointing the full complement of the five member Board. The Court
stated that a great many districts throughout the state would be adversely
affected by a ruling that all the determinations of the Board made after April
1, 1960, were void and expressed its apprehension over such "far reaching and
upsetting consequences." 7 The dissent argued that the new Act absolutely
abolished the old Board and that the old board members could not act unless
they were specifically appointed. The dissent declared that the majority had
no right to reach a strained construction simply because of the possible adverse
results which might follow from a proper reading of the statute. There is great
merit in trying to determine Legislative intent and in using results as a clue
to meaning, when the meaning of a statute is ambiguous. Such considerations,
however, should only apply when there is real doubt as to the meaning of the
statute. Unfortunately, courts out of policy considerations will often find doubt
and ambiguity where there is none and advance a construction in keeping with
their belief as to what the intent of the Legislature ought to have been rather
than what it actually was. The statute in the instant case has a clear meaning.
The Legislature created a permanent Board whose five members were "to be
appointed" by the Governor.8 The functions of the old Board were to be
transferred to the new,9 and all rules, regulations, orders, and determinations
of the temporary Board were to continue in force until changed by the new
Board.' 0 It was further provided that the unfinished business of the old Board
3. Capone v. Weaver, 6 N.Y.2d 307, 160 N.E.2d 602, 189 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1959).
4. Chittenden Lumber Co. v. Silberblatt & Lasker Inc., 288 N.Y. 396, 43 N.E.2d 459(1942).
S. Town of Putnam Valley v. Slutzky, 283 N.Y. 334, 28 N.E.2d 860 (1940).
6. Emerson v. Buck, 230 N.Y. 380, 130 N.E. 584 (1921).
7. Town of Smithtown v. Moore, 11 N.Y.2d 238, 244, 183 N.E.2d 66, 69, 228 N.Y.S.2d
657, 661 (1962).
8. N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law § 200.
9. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1960, ch. 335, § 10.
10. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1960, ch. 335, § 15.
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could be completed by the new Board." In addition, the law created a Division
of Equalization and Assessment which Was to carry out, the policies of the
permanent Board12 and into which all officers and employees of the temporary
Board should be transferred.'3
It is clear that the essential purpose of the statute was to effect the
transfer of the powers and duties of the temporary Board to the permanent
Board. Nowhere in the statute is it stated that the temporary board members
should continue to exercise rate-making power in the absence of their appoint-
ment to the new Board. Nor does such authority arise by implication. The
majority, recognizing that this implication cannot be found in the statute, and
realizing a contrary decision would create chaos in the tax system, chose to
read into the statute an ambiguity, and justified the interpretive procedure
by cloaking it in a protective mantle of legislative intent. Such a procedure is
unjustified when the statute, as in the instant case, is clear.
R. J. D.
TEACHER TENURE-WAIVER
After a meeting of the local school board, a teacher was dismissed without
written charges and a hearing as required by N.Y. Education Law, section
3013. The school agreed to pay the teacher's salary for the duration of the
school year and to give her a letter of recommendation for a new teaching
position in return for the teacher's waiving her right to a hearing under the
Education Law. The teacher after having accepted the salary and waiting an
additional two years sought a statutory hearing and back pay. The school
board appealed from an Appellate Division ruling in favor of the teacher.'
Held: affirmed, with two judges dissenting, because Education Law section
3013 forbids a waiver for consideration by a teacher to written charges and a
hearing, as contrary to the avowed public policy of giving a substantial degree
of permanency to the jobs of experienced teachers. To admit otherwise, the
Court added, would permit local school boards to fashion public policy as
they see fit. The Court also held that the paying of a teacher's salary for not
teaching is in violation of the N.Y. Constitution, as an unconstitutional gift
of public monies. *Boyd v. Collins, 11 N.Y.2d 228, 182 N.E.2d 610, 228
N.Y.S.2d 228 (1962).
No prior relevant case law deals with the question. Although there is a
limited prohibition against waiver in section 96 of the Civil Service Law, it is
applicable only to "candidates for employment." No similar prohibition is
found in the Education Law. It would seem to follow from the instant case that
since the agreement was void, as a matter of law, there was an unconstitu-
11. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1960, ch. 335, § 16.
12. N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law § 201.
13. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1960, ch. 335, § 11.
1. 14 A.D.2d 645, 218 N.Y.S.2d 203 (3d Dep't 1961).
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